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Bisch v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (May 3, 2013)1 
 
MISCELLANEOUS - A PEACE OFFICER’S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION IN A PPA 





This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review and denying 




The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in upholding the decision of the Employee 
Management Relations Board (EMRB). In its review, the Court adopted the federal burden of 
persuasion for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under NRS 288.270. 
Additionally, the Court held that NRS 289.080 only imposes duties on employers, not PPAs, an 
issue of first impression of Nevada. 
 
Facts and Procedural History  
 
This case arises out of a dog bite of a 17-year-old girl and Bisch’s subsequent actions in the 
ensuing medical treatment. Bisch is a police officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department (LVMPD). Bisch ran unsuccessfully for Clark County Sherriff in 2006 and it was 
well known that she planned to run again in 2010.  
 
In 2008, Bisch’s dog bit her daughter’s friend. Bisch took the girl to the urgent care facility but 
was unable to contact the girl’s mother. Fearing that the urgent care facility would not provide 
treatment without the girl’s legal guardian present, Bisch represented that the girl was actually 
her own daughter.  
 
The girl’s mother filed a complaint with LVMPD, alleging that Bisch had committed insurance 
fraud by misrepresenting the girl’s identity to the urgent care facility. The complaint lodged an 
Internal Affairs (IA) investigation. In preparation for the IA interview, Bisch informed her police 
protective association (PPA) representative that she had retained a private attorney, but requested 
that a PPA representative also be present. The PPA representative responded that, per the PPA 
bylaws, the PPA provided representation only when the member did not procure his or her own 
attorney. The interview proceeded without PPA representation.  
 
The IA investigator determined that Bisch had not committed insurance fraud. However, upon 
the deputy district attorney’s suggestion that Bisch may have committed identity theft in 
violation of NRS 205.463, the IA Investigator recommended sustaining the initial complaint on 
the ground that Bisch had committed identity theft. Because Bisch could not be found to have 
committed identity theft, LVMPD sustained the complaint for the lesser violation of LVMPD 
Civil Service Rule 501.2(G)(1), which forbids “[c]onduct unbecoming an employee.” Bisch 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By	  Katelyn	  J.	  Cantu	  
	   2	  
received a formal written reprimand, which was removed, per LVMPD policy, from her 
employee file eighteen months later.  
 
Following the written reprimand, Bisch filed a complaint with the EMRB against both the PPA 
and LVMPD. First, Bisch alleged that the PPA had breached its duty of fair representation when 
it refused to represent her at her IA interview because (1) the refusal was politically motivated by 
the PPA’s endorsement of a different candidate for sheriff in the 2006 election, and (2) the 
refusal violated her right, pursuant to NRS 289.080, to have two representatives of her choosing 
at the IA interview.  
 
Second, with respect to LVMPD, Bisch alleged that (1) LVMPD had implemented overly broad 
disciplinary criteria by disciplining her for off-duty conduct that had no actual effect on her 
ability to perform her job, and (2) that her written reprimand was a politically motivated attempt 
to thwart her 2010 campaign for sheriff.  
 
The EMRB held a two-day hearing and denied Bisch’s claims in their entirety. The district court 




Justice Parraguirre delivered the opinion of the court, sitting as a six-justice panel with Justices 
Gibbons, Hardesty, Douglas, Cherry, and Saitta, who concurred. The Honorable Kristina 
Pickering, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused herself.  
 
Birsch’s Appeal is Not Moot 
 
The Court first addressed the issue of whether Bisch’s LVMPD claims are moot following the 
removal of the written reprimand from Bisch’s employee file. In Nevada, a case that presents a 
real controversy at the time of its institution “may become moot by the happening of subsequent 
events.”2 However, despite removal of the written reprimand, the Court found that the alleged 
political motivation of the reprimand and the potential effect it could have on Bisch’s political 
ambitions demonstrate that an actual controversy still exists. Accordingly, the Court declined 
LVMPD’s request to dismiss the appeal as moot.   
 
The EMRB Properly Rejected Bisch’s Duty -of -Fair-Representation Claim  
 
Next, the Court addressed whether NRS 289.080 imposes a duty on Bisch’s PPA to provide a 
representative for an investigatory interview by her employer.  
 
Bisch alleges that the PPA policy violates NRS 289.080(1), arguing that NRS 289.080(1) grants 
her the right to have two representatives of her choosing at the interview. NRS 289.080(1) 
provides: “[A] peace officer who is the subject of an investigation . . . may upon request have 
two representatives of the peace officer’s choosing present with the peace officer during any 
phase of an interrogation or hearing relating to the investigation.”3 In looking at the plain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., 97 Nev. 56, 58, 624 P.2d 10, 11 (1981).  
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 289.080(1) (2011) (emphasis added).  
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language of the statue, the Court concluded that the statute does not impose any affirmative 
duties on an entity to provide a representative at the interview. Furthermore, applying the broader 
statutory scheme, the Court concluded that the duties of NRS Chapter 289 are only imposed on 
employers, not PPAs.4  
 
Therefore, the Court found that the protection provided by NRS 289.080 is only in regard to 
Bisch’s employer and does not govern a PPA’s responsibility towards its members. Thus, the 
EMRB correctly concluded that NRS 289.080 did not impose an additional duty-of-fair-
representation on the PPA.  
 
The EMRB Properly Upheld LVMPD’s Written Reprimand of Bisch 
 
Lastly, the Court addressed whether the EMRB properly upheld LVMPD’s written reprimand. 
Bisch challenged the written reprimand on the grounds that LVMPD had (1) used improper 
criteria in issuing the discipline under Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1) because LVMPD 
disciplined her for off-duty conduct, and (2) improperly disciplined her for political reasons in 
violation of NRS 288.270(1)(f).  
 
 The Conduct for which Bisch was Disciplined was Sufficiently Related to the 
Performance of her Duties as a Peace Officer 
 
First, the Court addressed whether LVMPD used improper criteria in issuing the written 
reprimand under Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1). Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1) provides: “The 
term ‘misconduct’ shall mean not only improper action by an employee in his official capacity, 
but also any conduct by an employee unconnected with his official duties, tending to bring the 
Department into public discredit which tends to affect the employee’s ability to perform his 
duties efficiently . . ..”5 Because a police officer’s job is to uphold the law, the act of lying to an 
urgent care staff in order to circumvent a perceived parental-consent law could plausibly bear 
directly upon Bisch’s fitness to be an officer.6  
 
 Substantial Evidence Supports the EMRB’s Conclusion that Bisch was not Disciplined 
for Political Reasons 
 
Next, the Court addressed whether the EMRB properly rejected Bisch’s claim that the discipline 
was politically motivated in violation of NRS 288.270(1)(f). NRS 288.270(1)(f) prohibits 
discrimination against an employee by a local government employer or the employer’s 
designated representative for “political or personal reasons or affiliation.”7 To establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under NRS 288.270(1)(f), the Court applies the Transportation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  NRS § 289.060 states, “Any peace officer aggrieved by an action of the employer of the peace officer in violation 
of this chapter may, after exhausting any applicable . . . administrative remedies, apply to the district court for 
judicial relief.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 289.060 (2011). Accordingly, the Court found that Nevada law enforcement bill 
of rights afford peace officers certain procedural protections when dealing with their employer in an adversarial 
setting.  
5  Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1).  
6  For example, the Court notes that Bisch’s untruthfulness could be used to impeach her credibility if she were 
called as a witness to testify at trial.	  	  
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.270(1)(f) (2011).  
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Management test used to adjudicate federal prohibited-labor-practice claims under the National 
Labor Relations Act.8 Pursuant to the Transportation Management test,  
 
An aggrieved employee must make a prima facie showing 
sufficient to support the inference that the protected conduct was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision. Once this is 
established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the same 
action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected 
conduct. The aggrieved employee may then offer evidence that the 
employer’s proffered “legitimate” explanation is pretextual and 
thereby conclusively restore the inference of unlawful motivation.9 
 
However, since the U.S. Supreme Court has since modified the Transportation Management test, 
the Court adopted the revised Greenwich Collieries10 framework. Under the revised Greenwich 
Collieries standards, it is not enough for the employee to merely put forth evidence that is 
capable of being believed (burden of production); rather, this evidence must actually be believed 
by the fact-finding (burden of persuasion).11 Although the EMRB applied the Transportation 
Management test, the Court found that that there is substantial evidence to support a 
determination that the burden of persuasion was satisfied.  
 
The EMRB found that LVMPD had produced enough evidence to satisfy its burden regarding its 
nondiscriminatory justification, listing four specific reasons. However, the Court focused 
primarily on the fact that ample evidence in the record supported the conclusion that a violation 
of Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1) actually did occur. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
EMRB’s conclusion that LVMPD established a nondiscriminatory reason for discipline was 
supported by substantial evidence.   
 
Thus, the burden shifted back to Bisch, but Bisch provided no factual basis, other than one 
investigator’s reference to the investigation as a “tower caper,” and no evidence that continuing 
the investigation was contrary to any IA policy. Accordingly, the Court found that EMRB was 
correct to conclude that Bisch did not satisfy her burden to show that the LVMPD’s stated 




The Court found that the EMRB decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court denying a petition for judicial review and denying declaratory and 
injunctive relief.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See Reno Police Protective Ass’n v. City of Reno, 102 Nev. 98, 715 P.2d 1321 (1986).  
9  Id. at 1323 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 383, 403 (1983), abrogated by Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, DOL v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276-78 (1994)).  
10  Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, DOL v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).  
11  Id. at 276-78. 	  
